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ABSTRACT The changing terms of mediation place new demands, opportunities and risks
on the performance of the political persona. Visibility has become a double-edged sword,
leaving representatives vulnerable to exposure while new tools provide opportunities for
emerging entrepreneurial actors. This double risk to elites’mediated personas—exposure and
challenge from entrepreneurs—renders their armour of authenticity dangerously fragile,
which nourishes a public sense of being inefﬁcaciously represented. It is this climate in which
populism currently ﬂourishes around the globe. Three primary criteria of mediated self-
representation by politicians—visibility, authenticity and efﬁcacy—form the focus of this
paper: how do populists negotiate such demands in different democratic contexts, and
wherein lies the symbiosis between populism and the new media environment suggested by
the literature? To answer this, the paper compares two populist cases responding to different
democratic contexts: UKIP, a right-wing party from an established democracy (UK), and the
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a left-wing party from a transitional democracy (South
Africa). The objects of study are disruptive performances by these parties, which are con-
sidered emblematic manifestations of populist ideology as they establish a Manichaean
relationship between the elite and populist actors who embody the people. The paper
introduces disruption as a multi-faceted and signiﬁcant analytical concept to explain the
populist behaviour and strategies that underlie populist parties’ responses to the demands for
visibility, authenticity and efﬁcacy that the new media environment places upon political
representatives. Using mixed methods with an interpretive focus, the paper paints a rich
picture of the contexts, meanings and means of construction of populist performances.
DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0101-0 OPEN
1 School of Media and Communication, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK. Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to
L.S. (email: L.N.Sorensen@leeds.ac.uk)
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 4:48 | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0101-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms 1
12
34
56
78
9
0
()
:,;
Introduction
Cape Town, 12 February 2015. A media event is in progress:photographers, prominent authorities and celebrity guests,designer dresses, swirls, photogenic smiles. But this year’s
State of the Nation Address (SONA) is not only keenly mediated
for its pomp and ceremony. The reason why the nation is glued to
their television screens, and why the SONA becomes South
Africa’s ﬁrst real ‘social media event’ (du Plessis, 2015), is the
promise of that most exciting form of politics: disruption, con-
troversy, possibly (oh glee!) even violence, democracy being put
to the test and disintegrating in real-time before the eyes of the
nation.
Both the media’s and the public’s expectations are fulﬁlled. In a
protest carefully designed to comply with parliamentary rules,
MPs from the populist opposition party Economic Freedom
Fighters (EFF) one by one rise 'on a point of order…in terms of
rule 14 C'1 to question President Zuma on corruption charges.
They succeed—not in gaining Zuma’s admission of guilt but in
exposing his SONA as a masquerade that is designed to hide the
real state of the nation. An increasingly impatient and frustrated
speaker eventually breaks parliamentary rules and orders armed
police to forcefully evict the EFF from the House. This, also, is
part of the EFF’s performance which has carefully provoked the
reaction of their authoritarian antagonists. Fist ﬁghts ensue to the
delight, shock and awe of the tweeting broadcast audience.
At a remove of almost 10,000 miles and several centuries of
democratic experience, the United Kingdom Independence Party
(UKIP) fan the glowing embers of disenchantment with the
European Union’s grip on the sovereignty of the British people.
They, also, disrupt the norms and rituals of a democratic insti-
tution: the European Parliament (EP). As military bands strike up
and the EU ﬂag is ceremoniously hoisted, UKIP dismiss the EP
opening ceremony as ‘nationalist’, ‘militarist’ and democratically
hollow, turning their backs to the playing of the anthem.
Then-leader Nigel Farage excels at increasingly gleeful and
explicit breaches of the norms of political speech and behaviour
as the Brexit referendum draws near, is won and makes the
proverbial ﬁnger-sticking to the EU less proverbial. While UKIP’s
disruptions are more controlled than the EFF’s colourful drama—
conﬁned by the stringent norms and rules of the EP—Farage’s
repeated minor breaches of institutional norms provide con-
tinuous challenges to the establishment. Dripping with sarcasm,
they succeed in provoking regular rebukes from the EP chair,
reactions from the ﬂoor so indignant as to cause reprimands of
their own, and establishing a counter-culture that seeps into UK
mainstream politics.
UKIP and the EFF are performing their disruptive acts in a new
media environment that reﬂects changes in the relationship
between politics and the media. Despite the very different con-
texts of an established and a transitional democracy, the changing
terms of mediation in many ways place similar demands,
opportunities and risks on the performance of the political per-
sona (Corner, 2003). Visibility has become a double-edged sword
that makes representatives vulnerable to the constant dangers of
scandal, gaffes, leaks and exposed outbursts (Thompson, 2005, p
41ff) while giving visibility entrepreneurs (Dayan, 2013) the
opportunity to access power through new tools of visibility
management.
It is this climate in which populism currently ﬂourishes. Poli-
tical representatives’ difﬁculties in negotiating the demands on
the visibility of their mediated political personas render their
armour of authenticity dangerously fragile, which in turn nour-
ishes a public sense of being inefﬁcaciously represented. These
three primary criteria of mediated self-representation by politi-
cians—visibility, authenticity and efﬁcacy (Coleman, 2011)—
form the focus of this paper: how do populists negotiate such
demands in different democratic contexts, and wherein lies the
symbiosis between populism and the new media environment
suggested by the literature (see, e.g., Bos and Brants, 2014; Esser
et al., 2016; Krämer, 2017; Mazzoleni et al., 2003; Mofﬁtt, 2016;
Stanyer, 2007, chap. 5)?
I argue that, while the UK’s and South Africa’s different
pathways to democracy, political cultures and recent political
developments lead the two parties to position themselves differ-
ently in relation to democratic institutions, both perform as vis-
ibility entrepreneurs, seeking to undermine the elite’s fragile
control of visibility through disruptive performance. In exposing
the elite as impression managers, populists undermine the elite’s
authenticity and construct their own. Populists’ incitement of
distrust in politics is accompanied by a promise of efﬁcacious
representation which takes the form of identiﬁcation with the
people and the equation of authentic self-representation to truth
telling. This problematizes the changing environment for medi-
ated representation as it suggests that the emerging political
communication landscape rewards illiberalism.
I develop this argument through the exploration of two
populist case studies operating in very different democratic
contexts, yet both marked by key changes to the environment of
the mediation of politics: the radical-left opposition party the EFF
in South Africa, and the right-wing opposition party UKIP in the
UK. While I deﬁne populism as a thin-centred ideology according
to Mudde’s (2004) well-known deﬁnition,2 I am particularly
concerned with how populist ideology manifests itself in the
disruption of institutional norms and practices to thereby take
advantage of the opportunities offered by the new media
environment.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the ﬁrst
section I discuss the concept of mediation and its relationship to
populist communication and self-representation. I depart from
previous scholarship on the mediation of populism by placing less
emphasis on the institutional logic of this process. In this dis-
cussion, I draw on the concepts of visibility, authenticity and
efﬁcacy as an illustration of populism’s symbiosis with the new
media environment. In the second section I brieﬂy outline the
mixed methods and data sets that the study is based on. I then
move on to an analysis of how the EFF and UKIP respond to each
of the three challenges of visibility, authenticity and efﬁcacy in
their mediated self-representations. Finally, I discuss the impli-
cations to politics of populism’s relationship to mediation in
different democratic contexts.
The mediation of populism
The symbiosis between populist communication and the media
has mainly been approached from an institutionalist perspective
on mediation (Esser et al., 2016; Mazzoleni et al., 2003). This
tradition of mediation research approaches media as independent
social institutions with their own sets of norms and rules. Studies
have focused on the afﬁnity between a populist communication
style and ‘media logic’—the norms and routines that govern the
media’s operations (Altheide and Snow, 1979)—and have, for
instance, identiﬁed speciﬁc news values such as conﬂict framing,
strategic framing and personalisation that populism speaks to.
The social constructivist tradition of mediation research beyond
this institutionalist focus has been less explored in relation to
populist political communication even though it provides a fertile
avenue for investigating the mediation of populism in relation to
media technologies and norms of use as well as institutions.
Within the broader social constructivist tradition, the concept of
mediation describes 'how communication has to be grasped as a
process of mediating meaning construction' (Hepp and Krotz,
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2014, p 3) and is concerned with media’s role in the commu-
nicative construction of socio-cultural reality. The term media-
tion then refers to a more substantive operation than the act of
transmitting something through the media. Mediation is a pro-
blematic process concerned with the media’s power to shape
representations of ‘reality’ (Livingstone, 2009, p 5; Strömbäck,
2008, p 230), a process characterised by the media’s substantive
intervention to the extent that it affects and changes the object of
mediation. This includes how political reality is depicted and
understood.
Yet the social constructivist perspective allows us to understand
mediation as a more complex process than the linear transmis-
sion suggested by approaches with an institutionalist focus
(Couldry, 2008). Especially in the new media environment, both
the ﬂows and consequences of mediation are non-linear and
multi-directional, to the extent that they involve a 'process of
environmental transformation' (ibid. 2008, p 8). To paraphrase
Livingstone’s (2009) famous expression, everything is mediated.
The mediated and the media mutually shape each other’s con-
ditions of production, understanding and use (Lievrouw, 2014)
through a dialectic between a variety of actors, institutions and
the environments that support them (Silverstone, 2005, p 189).
With this complexity in mind, I follow Couldry in his deﬁnition
of mediation as,
capturing a variety of dynamics within media ﬂows… ﬂows
of production, ﬂows of circulation, ﬂows of interpretation
or reception, and ﬂows of recirculation as interpretations
ﬂow back into production or ﬂow outwards into general
social and cultural life. (2008, p 8)
The complex asymmetry and web of interconnections that this
approach engages with is different in emphasis but nonetheless
complementary to, and to some extent overlapping with, the
institutionalist focus that is dominant in the populism literature.
It allows us to examine not only the difﬁculties political actors
face in their attempts to manage their mediated self-
representations by adapting to media logic. It also enables con-
sideration of how certain actors have the potential to inﬂuence
other actors and their mediated personas, how mediated repre-
sentations travel and change within the media ecology, and the
wider socio-political implications that result from the interplay
between populist communication and the media in the hybrid
media system (Chadwick, 2013). I am here particularly concerned
with the way populists are able to make use of certain features of
the new media environment to affect the mediated representation
of the elite and to construct the environment in which they
operate. Rather than focusing on the linear relationship between
media institutions and populists, the adoption of Couldry’s
approach to the mediation of populism allows a more nuanced
consideration of how populists and elites interact through pro-
cesses of mediation, how they struggle over meaning and how
they represent each other. This perspective can then be related
directly to the political meaning constructed in populist ideology
—the representation of the elite in opposition to the people and
the consequent identiﬁcation of populists themselves with the
people—and the way in which it is communicated through
mediated disruptive performance.
Further, this perspective suggests a spatial transformation and
asymmetry as a consequence of changes in the media environ-
ment (Couldry, 2008, p 11–12). In the context of the mediation of
populism, this in turn allows us to consider how populists use the
symbolic action of disruptive performance in a variety of different
functions and meanings that together constitute an expression of
populist ideology whilst simultaneously transforming institu-
tional spaces into effective sites for the mediation of their self-
representations. By challenging institutionally embedded norms
and procedures, populists create new spaces for the ﬂows of
production, circulation, interpretation and recirculation of poli-
tical symbols and meanings; and in doing so, they set the con-
ditions for the elite’s image management practices and suggest
new epistemological conditions for the public’s interpretation of
politics. Coleman (2011) identiﬁes three primary criteria of
mediated representation that help us consider how political
representatives tackle this new environment: visibility, authenti-
city and efﬁcacy. In the following sections I discuss how these
criteria intersect with populist ideology and communication
practices.
Visibility. The requirement of visibility in mediated representa-
tion refers to how far representatives can be seen to represent us
(ibid. 2011, p 47). Thompson describes how communication
media have engendered a new form of visibility in which the ﬁeld
of vision is shaped 'by the distinctive properties of communica-
tion media, by a range of social and technical considerations
(such as camera angles, editing processes and organisational
interests and priorities) and by the new types of interaction that
these media make possible' (2005, p 35–36). Dayan (2013) even
argues that changes in the media environment have fostered a
new paradigm of visibility. From the perspective of public
representatives, these new affordances, practices and norms have
undeniably changed the art of managing visibility (Thompson,
1995, chap. 4), providing opportunities for self-presentation,
while the ubiquitous and multi-directional nature of mediation
also makes visibility uncontrollable and public images inherently
fragile.
The fragility to self-representation engendered by new forms of
visibility can become a weapon in the hands of populists. The
Manichaean element of populist ideology, which pitches the elite
against the people, manifests itself in populists’ attempts to
undermine the public images of elite representatives. Politicians
are well-known for their constant attempts at impression
management—sometimes better than for their engagement in
policy making—in response to the need for visible representation.
Feeding into growing public discontent with, and distrust of,
practices of impression management (Norris, 2001), coupled with
the assumption that disclosure of discrete activities serves a
democratic purpose, visibility has the potential to become not
only a “weapon of the witness” (Coleman, 2011, p 46) as wielded
by the media, but also a weapon of populists in their efforts to
pitch the elite against the people.
The ﬂows of production, circulation, interpretation and
recirculation of symbolic content are even more difﬁcult to
control with the advent of social media. Political actors are forced
to compete in shows of spectacle and drama against new non-elite
actors who grasp the opportunity afforded by new media to
become visibility entrepreneurs (Dayan, 2013). In Dayan’s terms,
visibility has become a right where withholding visibility is
equated to “a silencing process” (ibid. 2013, p 150) by elites akin
to ‘old-school’ authoritarian attempts at controlling communica-
tion media. The entry of such new actors into processes of
mediation introduces an element of contestation over political
symbols and meaning in online and physical spaces (Parry, 2015,
p 423). These opportunities allow ‘outsider’ actors—such as
populists—to not only acquire visibility but also to 'deﬁne the
visibility of others, to become organisers of visibility' (Dayan,
2013, p 143). They may then impede on the terrain of journalists
as the sole guardians of the holy grail of visibility. In conferring
visibility upon the elite through disruptive acts of exposure,
populists are able to provide the public with what Meyrowitz
(1986, p 47) terms a ‘sidestage’ view, making visible the elite’s act
of managing their own visibility by displaying the discrepancy
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between their front- and backstage behaviour (Goffman, 1959), to
expose the elite’s professed authenticity as an act of deception.
Authenticity. In his classical work The Ethics of Authenticity,
Taylor (1992, p 15–16) deﬁnes authenticity as a moral ideal of
staying true to oneself (see also Trilling, 1972). As a result, per-
ceived authenticity helps to build trust between politicians and
the public (Pels, 2003). At the same time, it is continuously
questioned and renegotiated. The prevalence of impression
management in the mediated relationship between politicians and
the public has resulted in the performance of authenticity being
aimed at a process of mediation; it has 'become a strategy in its
own right' (Enli, 2016, p 133). Yet citizens’ analytical skills in
deconstructing fake personas have also become more ﬁne-tuned.
While the media thirst for authentic politicians, they are therefore
also equally inquisitive as to their constructed nature. Eager to
expose backstage moments, they aid such deconstruction, with a
dual motive of justifying their own contribution to the public
sphere (Gurevitch et al., 2009, p 172–173; Louden and McCauliff,
2004) and surviving in a commercialised and competitive media
environment. The result is to reinforce the decline in the public’s
trust of institutional politics (Catterberg and Moreno, 2006; Hay,
2013) since this trust is further damaged by a perception that
'everything in politics is designed for popular appeal' (Norris,
2001, p 168). Completing the cycle, authenticity then becomes a
particularly coveted attribute in political self-representation
(Coleman, 2005, p 194; Enli, 2016).
When considering authenticity in relation to the media and
processes of mediation, we therefore become more concerned
with the appearance of being authentic rather than with the moral
ideal itself as it comes from within. Despite the seeming
contradiction, authenticity, when aimed at a process of mediation,
is a performed quality where the performer 'seems as though he or
she is true to his or her inner self' (Enli, 2015, p 111, my
emphasis). Perceived authenticity by the public is therefore a
mark of a successful performance (Alexander, 2011, p 54) in
which the audience allow the characters onstage to merge with
the actors who play them. A truly consistent and authentic
political identity can only be achieved if the politician’s public
persona appears consistent with the private one; the performance
of authenticity must never be seen to be performed. Managing
visibility, and managing it well, so as to provide a consistent,
spontaneous and intimate performance of authenticity (Enli,
2015, chap. 6) becomes so much more vital and so much more
fraught with danger. Especially when populist disruptive
characters are at play.
Populist ideology may then take the form of exposing elites as
inauthentic and strategic performers, thereby rendering them
inauthentic. A populist strategy of making visible the false
authenticity performances by the elite feeds into a climate of
public mistrust characterised by the precariousness of authenti-
city in mediated representation. But disruptive acts also serve to
construct populists’ own authenticity. In the words of Healey
(2010, p 530), 'notions of authenticity… idealize the creative
transgression of social norms'; that is, they idealise disruptive
performance.
Efﬁcacy. The struggles of public representatives to deal with the
changing conditions of mediation through impression manage-
ment have fed disenchantment with politics in the public to the
extent that ‘politics’ has become a dirty word. As Hay argues, 'to
attribute “political” motives is now invariably to question that
actor’s honesty, integrity or capacity to deliver an outcome that
reﬂects anything other than his or her material self-interest' (Hay,
2013, p 1). The awareness of the deceit inherent in mediated
representation and public communication therefore affects how
people feel about politics and whether they feel properly repre-
sented (Bennett and Entman, 2001; Cappella and Jamieson,
1997). Efﬁcacy is a subjective experience of how the represented
perceive their own political agency to 'inﬂuence representatives to
say and do the right things, or punish them if they don’t'
(Coleman, 2011, p 45). As such, it is based on a communicative
relationship between representatives and the public (ibid.).
Heightening feelings of efﬁcacy would then rely on making such a
relationship appear more meaningful, and possibly more direct,
less mediated (or, at least, less problematically mediated).
The denunciation of processes and practices of mediation—
both in relation to political institutions and to communication—
is argued to be a central aspect of populism (see, e.g., De la Torre,
2014, p 18; Krämer, 2014; Kriesi, 2014). Populists seek to
reinforce a sense that power runs directly from the people to
themselves as representatives. They therefore evoke a gulf
between elites and people over which this bond cannot stretch
and demonstrate the closeness of their own connection to the
people. Ironically, their condemnation of mediation within this
claim fulﬁls one of the criteria of mediated representation, namely
efﬁcacy.
Internal efﬁcacy—citizens’ perceptions of their personal
political competence and inﬂuence—has recently been connected
to the access to information afforded by new media technologies
(Coleman et al., 2008; Halpern et al., 2017). In a focus group
study conducted in the Leeds area, Coleman et al. (2008) further
report that most participants perceived such technologies to
establish a more direct link to their representatives. Participants
articulated a sense of estrangement from the political world,
which often resided in ofﬁcial language, uniformly referred to as
'political correctness' (ibid., p 779). In this sense, a populist
communication style, characterised by ‘ordinariness’ and ‘bad
manners’ (Mofﬁtt, 2016, p 44–45) may serve to increase internal
efﬁcacy, especially when such a style remains intact in the process
of mediation, for instance through social media.
Meanwhile, Coleman et al.’s study suggests that external
efﬁcacy—the perceived responsiveness of representatives—is
decreased by the perception that representatives will only initiate
an interactive relationship with the public for the purpose of
garnering votes during election campaigns (2008, p 780–781).
Such relationships can often be characterised by a lack of
understanding of common everyday life and by practices of
deception (ibid. 2008, p 782). Populist acts of disruption aimed at
undermining efﬁcacious representation by the elite through the
exposure of such practices of deception can consequently be seen
as a direct manifestation of populist ideology.
Method
This study adopted a comparative case study design combined
with a mixed methods approach to explore how populists use
disruptive performances to negotiate changes to the conditions of
visibility, authenticity and efﬁcacy of mediated representation in
different democratic contexts. Whilst comparing two parties
situated in the similar overall liberal-democratic contexts of the
UK and South Africa, the cases display clear contrasts in the more
speciﬁc elements of their historical and socio-political conditions.
The case study approach allows a multidimensional, thick
description of the cases as situated in their respective contexts,
while the comparative design enables the drawing of parallels and
contrasts between the two distinctive, multidimensional contexts.
Socio-political conditions, such as party status (opposition),
regime type (dominant-party rule versus established representa-
tive democracy), path of democratic transition (bottom-up lib-
eration and current backwards trajectory with weak institutions
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versus stable, established and strong institutions) and mode of
representation (descriptive mode with lack of responsiveness
versus active mode with lack of identiﬁcation) were inﬂuential in
my choice of case studies. While these conditions constrain and
enable the two parties’ disruptive performances, institutional
norms form a yardstick for discursive practice, for instance in the
form of rituals that seek to conﬁne disruption by making norms
incontestable. Disruptive performances seek to violently overturn
established norms and construct a ‘new normal’. While material
conditions thus constitute the framework of the research design,
my concern is with how populists portray this reality, and change
it in the process of doing so.
To investigate this I used a mixed methods concurrent nested
design (Creswell et al., 2003, p 229–230). I gave priority to qua-
litative research, primarily using the quantitative element for
purposes of zoom-in sampling of Twitter data for interpretive
analysis (Gerbaudo, 2016). I further integrated a descriptive
quantitative analysis at the interpretation stage of research for
purposes of triangulation, contextualisation and enrichment,
placing the populist disruptive performances in a broader medi-
ated context (see Figure 1).
The data used for this paper are part of a larger study that relies
on a broad range of communicative outputs—conceived as ele-
ments of performance in both live, digital and otherwise mediated
forms—by UKIP and the EFF that map a total of six disruptive
performances in the South African and European parliaments
between July 2014 and April 2017: video footage and ofﬁcial
transcripts of live performances in parliamentary settings, press
releases, tweets, media appearances, newspaper columns and
promotional YouTube videos. I supplemented these commu-
nications by the two populist parties during their disruptive
performances with media coverage of the events and public
conversations on Twitter about the events. I selected the sampling
periods and thereby also deﬁned the duration of the events based
on when the given populist party initiated and ended their own
communications about the event. Together the data sets of direct
populist communications and their mediated manifestations
provide a multi-dimensional, rich picture of the immediate
context of each disruption: the main actors’ justiﬁcation for and
legitimisation of the disruption, media coverage of the disruption,
and the immediate public reaction to the disruption.3
The Twitter data formed the quantitative element of the mixed
methods design and was collected concurrently with the
remaining data. For the quantitative sample, I iteratively identi-
ﬁed hashtags and keywords related to the given event and used
the open source tool Mecodify4 to scrape and visualise historical
data from Twitter. Initially the quantitative data set formed the
basis of a descriptive analysis that reconstructed the events,
visually mapping online public activity to ofﬂine events and
media coverage in a normalised histogram. I then I went beyond
the approach of data analytics often adopted in big data studies
and gave priority to a data hermeneutics approach (Gerbaudo,
2016). For this purpose I used the same tool to conduct zoom-in
sampling during peaks of activity and/or signiﬁcant moments of a
live disruption. These smaller data samples of the Twitter public’s
reaction to ofﬂine events supplemented my primary data of
communications in various media and modes initiated by the two
populist parties during the events.
For the interpretive analysis of populist communications I
inductively coded all data relying on a grounded theory-based
analytical approach (Charmaz, 2006). In the analysis of populist
performance, I paid particular attention to the construction of
binaries (Van Dijk, 2016) and chains of equivalence (Carpentier
and De Cleen, 2007; Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002) to assess how
the populist parties constructed reality in different media. In
particular, I considered how populist disruptive performances
sought to manage their own and the elite’s visibility, how they
constructed authenticity and rendered the elite inauthentic, and
how they sought to engender efﬁcacy through the interplay
between their communication style, ideology and media use.
I deﬁne the objects of analysis—disruptive performances in
parliamentary institutional contexts—'literally as a disruption of
parliamentary business and procedure, and ﬁguratively as a
disruption of the norms embedded within the ritual of parlia-
mentary debate' (Spary, 2010, p 338). In the context of populism,
I conceive of disruptive performance by populist actors as an
especially emblematic manifestation of populist ideology that is
geared towards processes of mediation: a challenge to main-
stream politics that pitches the elite against the people through
an explicit and spectacular struggle over democratic norms and
procedures and that speaks to the conditions of the new media
environment. Disruptive performances are therefore a rich
source of data on populist self-representation in relation to
mediated events.
According to Goffman (1959), performance is an embodied
activity that inﬂuences its observers. Such activity displays
meaning that the actor(s) wish to have their audience believe
(Alexander, 2004, p 530). An effective performance must be
plausible and lead 'those to whom their actions and gestures are
directed to accept their motives and explanations as a reasonable
account' (ibid.). This notion of performance relates to Austin’s
(1975) concept of performativity whereby certain types of speech
acts—which we may here extend to symbolic acts more generally
(see, e.g., Alexander, 2006) as the objects of study in question—
have the ability to realise their semantic contents. That is, they
construct reality. Austin suggested that the evaluative standard of
such performatives be ‘felicity,’ as opposed to truth or accuracy,
since the latter do not necessarily denote whether performatives
work successfully.
According to Alexander (2006) ritual is the ultimate successful
performance since their status is unquestionable and their char-
acter is perceived as being authentic. Populist disruptions of
political rituals can therefore be seen as attempts to undermine
their felicity by exposing the reality that they construct as just
that, constructed. The performative struggle between elite ritual
and populist disruption is a struggle that seeks to deploy the
weapon of visibility to undermine the authenticity of the
opposing party’s act and, ultimately, their efﬁcacy. The data used
for this study therefore seek to map this site of struggle in a rich
picture of how populist actors construct political meaning in
response to elites.
The struggle over mediation: the self-representation of UKIP
and the EFF and the criteria of mediated representation
Populists are famously antagonistic towards mainstream media
whom they perceive as part of the elite. UKIP state in a tweet, 'our
media are guilty of double standards',5 while the EFF complain of
'sustained media attacks… with the sole aim of casting aspersions
on [our] leadership and the organisation as a whole'.6 The
Data collecon and sampling Data analysis Data interpretaon
+
quant
QUAL
quant
QUAL QUAL
quant
Figure 1 Mixed methods research design
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demands on mediated representation for visibility, authenticity
and efﬁcacy can therefore be expected to grate with populists. But
do they? I explore populist self-representation in relation to the
three criteria of visibility, authenticity and efﬁcacy in the fol-
lowing three sections. In each section I investigate UKIP’s and the
EFF’s reproof of the elite’s pandering to the media, the parties’
own self-representations in relation to the media, and their per-
formative orientations towards the media’s demands for visibility,
authenticity and efﬁcacy, despite their seemingly antagonistic
relationship. In doing so I distinguish between the populist claims
at face value and the way in which they are constructed and
performed through disruption with a view to their mediation.
The weapon of visibility. The unquestionable status of political
rituals as successful performances make them natural sites of
performative and discursive struggle over the management of
visibility. In both UKIP’s and the EFF’s disruptive performances,
institutional rituals are portrayed as masquerades that undermine
the democratic function of parliament: 'Parliament which is
supposed to ﬁght corruption by holding the executive accountable
has been turned into a fashion parade',7 tweet the EFF in their
report of the SONA media event. The EFF refuse to conform to
the formalities of the elaborately staged ceremony, remaining
sitting when all others stand during the president’s arrival.
Describing it as 'that state of the nonsense',8 they point to the
meaninglessness of the staged ritual and its discrepancy with the
reality of South African politics: 'When you are telling a so-called
good story here, the children of Sxwetla sleep side by side with
rats…'.9 The EFF thus engage in disruption through an assem-
blage of live symbolic action, tweets and other direct commu-
nications to provide a sidestage view of the elite’s performance of
ritual as a visibility management practice.
Like the EFF, UKIP seek to expose European Parliamentary
norms and rituals as staged visibility events that are detrimental
to democratic representation. At the EP’s opening ceremony,
then-deputy leader Paul Nuttall points out the emptiness of its
'faux nationalis[t]'10 symbols as antithetical to ‘proper representa-
tion’: 'We stand up for our people, not the EU ﬂag and anthem'.11
Nuttall defuses the symbolic value of the EP’s ritual and portrays
it as directly detrimental to 'our people' and as self-serving: the
ritual is not a means of democratic representation but a staged
spectacle designed to manage and control visibility. UKIP then
perform a silent protest of turning their backs to the playing of
the EU anthem, uncannily echoing the EFF’s refusal to stand for
President Zuma.
Both parties thus engage in symbolic acts aimed at exposing the
constructed and empty nature of elite rituals. They deny any
practices of visibility management themselves, which they even
portray as incompatible with principled democratic practice
—'We shouldn’t chase headlines. We must stick to the principle',
tweet the EFF.12 Farage likewise points out the unscripted nature
of UKIP’s political communication practices: 'the people’s army
has not been carefully engineered by an imaginative press
ofﬁce'.13 Yet both parties’ disruptions are designed and staged
with visibility in mind. The EFF’s orchestration of their major
disruption is elaborate. They promise drama through an
entrepreneurial use of Twitter in the lead-up to the event. EFF
leader Malema for instance tweets, 'For the ﬁrst time in the
history of the South Africa, something is going to happen in the
#SONA'.14 Continuing to build up tension, he posts an image of a
smug-looking Zuma with the incendiary caption 'We are ready
for u boy'.15
The EFF’s threat to deﬁne the visibility of the South African
elite serves to manage their own visibility by creating media
coverage. But it also increases the elite’s anxiety over their
threatened visibility to the extent that they prepare to—and do—
transgress liberal democratic practice in a last-ditch attempt at
control. The government blocks the mobile telephone signal in
the parliamentary chamber to prevent journalists from using the
affordances of internet-based media to report on the expected
disruption, and it bans the public broadcaster SABC from
showing the ruckus of the EFF’s expulsion from the House in an
attempt to control the mediated reality. Meanwhile the hashtags
#SONA and #SONA2015 experience an unprecedented peak on
Twitter of 348,755 tweets16 for a South African political event. In
this medium, the EFF take up the ﬁght over mediated reality:
'SABC has been instructed not to show EFF MPs',17 they tweet.
The EFF proceed to usurp the role of the public broadcaster,
using the style of tweeting that Larsson in his typology denotes
Twitter’s broadcasting function (2015). They live-tweet reports of
events every few minutes and convey in graphic and visual detail
all the to-do not shown by the SABC to a rapt national audience.
The EFF succeed in performatively constructing a reality where
they are the conveyors of truth, the government the unsuccessful
authoritarian censors.
UKIP also make entrepreneurial use of the new media
environment in ways that build up and complement live
disruptions aimed at broadcast audiences. Farage takes to Twitter
to warn that 'Sparks will ﬂy'18 in a build-up of tension before his
provocative EP speech on the UK’s triggering of Article 50 that
commenced her exit from the EU. As Farage is about to start the
speech, he glances directly up at the camera, catching its eye and
betraying his awareness of the wider broadcast audience that he
may garner with his disruptive performance. UKIP follow up live
events on social media, for instance posting a disdainful YouTube
video19 of an EP opening ceremony, featuring Farage in a
supposedly backstage moment having a conversation with a
fellow MEP in which he equates the EP ritual to the nationalist
militarism of Nazism. This supposedly private-conversation-
made-public is portrayed as fully consistent with Farage’s
frontstage behaviour, resonating with arguments he puts directly
to the EP and in public newspaper columns. It thus implicitly
contrasts UKIP’s own performances with the inconsistencies
between front and backstage behaviour that the elite exhibit in
their attempts to manage visibility.
Disruption as a source of authenticity. In a climate where new
weapons of visibility make self-representations increasingly fra-
gile, authenticity becomes a prized possession. Consistently with
populist ideology, the authenticity of the elite becomes a prime
target for populists. Both UKIP and the EFF accuse the elite of
scripted performance: 'Zuma… must not read to us. We’re not in
Sunday school'.20 The exposure of elite performance as unspon-
taneous, calculated and aimed at mediation engenders mistrust of
the elite’s intentions, a suspicion of inconstancy and fabrication in
their mediated front, and prevents intimacy with the public. The
EFF repeatedly expose the ANC’s calculated rhetoric, such as
their 'hollow recitals of the Freedom Charter…that are not gen-
uine'.21 In fact, the EFF claim, the ANC’s programme is wholly
inconsistent with the Freedom Charter, and 'any talk of the
Freedom Charter is meant to mislead the people of South
Africa'22 (my emphasis). In South African politics, such false,
empty evocation of the Freedom Charter equates to democratic
blasphemy, a betrayal of the ideas underlying the struggle for
independence, which in turn is a betrayal of the people and their
liberty.
UKIP likewise expose the constructed nature of the elite’s
authenticity. Farage accuses his fellow MEPs of expressing 'faux
outrage', 'hyperbole' and 'hysteria'23 in a debate about President
Trump’s new immigration measures. The elite’s apparent moral
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indignation is staged for the media in a false performance of
authenticity, he claims, and proof lies in the inconsistency
between the elite’s 'rhetoric' and their previous actions and
positions on related issues:
…where were you when Obama, in 2011, banned any Iraqi
from going into the country for six months? Why do I hear
no criticism in this chamber or from the Commission of
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and others who have refused
to take a single, not one, refugee or displaced person from
Syria?24
He exposes the elite’s rhetoric as an attempt to hide their
extremist world view—their 'anti-democratic zealot[ry]'25—
behind an empty performance for the cameras.
For their own part, UKIP’s message is portrayed as sincere and
consistent with its values: UKIP MEPs claim to be 'a team who
believe in what they say', not changing their 'accents and grit'26
for the sake of impressing the media. The EFF express
comparable sincerity and genuine belief in their 'radical and
militant programme' which they 'unapologetically pursue'.27 Like
UKIP, they legitimise this belief with its 'true resonance with the
people of South Africa'28 and their own identiﬁcation with the
people. Both parties’ authenticity is proven by the consistency
between their frontstage and their backstage behaviour.
The two parties not only state their claims to consistent and
authentic personas. They also generate these claims performa-
tively. Their acts of disruption have an inherently spontaneous
quality, for staged spontaneity can at times seem more
spontaneous than ‘real’ spontaneity (Enli, 2015, p 10; see also
Goffman, 1959, p 8–9). Such spontaneity suggests that the
breaking of norms is a worthwhile sacriﬁce to express oneself in
accordance with one’s true self (Enli, 2015, p 10; Healey, 2010, p
530), that is, to be authentic. The two populist parties even go one
step further in generating authentic self-representation through
disruptive performance. They use the new media environment to
redeﬁne authenticity, equating it to truth telling. Farage makes a
point of paying homage to the 'institution of truth',29 not the
norms of the institution of the Commission, when he is
reprimanded by the EP chair for breaking the norms of acceptable
political speech. Afterwards he takes to Twitter to further
associate his disruptive act with truth telling: 'Just gave both
barrels to the unelected EU commission. These guys have a
problem with the truth'.30 This self-representation as truth teller
in contrast with the falsity of the elite is echoed by the EFF who
portray themselves as 'an organisation that always tells the truth
and claims no easy victories'.31
Both parties claim to serve a democratic function through their
acts of disruption since the people would be unable to see the
truth were it not for their intervention. Farage tweets, 'If I’ve
helped the British people understand how ridiculous the EU are
behaving, I couldn’t give a damn who I upset'.32 The EFF likewise
portray themselves as saviours of a misguided people when they
criticise the elite for 'playing with South Africans'.33 They even go
so far as to attack the people for living with a lie and not wanting
to face up to the truth:
Parliament continue to violate the constitution. And every
South African is happy, every South African is celebrating
that and condemning those who are saying this is wrong.
Those who are saying this is wrong get condemned, they’re
disruptive, they’re disrespectful, you’re so comfortable to
live with a lie, you’re so scared of the truth!34
But in doings so, the EFF refuse to lay claim to the accusation
of disruption, a term that, in the South African context, carries
negative connotations as it suggests damage to fragile democratic
institutions.
The different democratic conditions faced by the two parties
suggest different expressions of relations between populist actors
and people. UKIP adopt the role of helping a silent majority
realise their own lack of voice in a heavily formalised and
inﬂexible institutional setting that allows limited room for
manoeuvre outside of stiﬂing and self-perpetuating norms.
According to UKIP’s claim, compliance with the norms of
political speech prevents the expression of true belief, making
disruption a democratic necessity. In the context of the strictly
norm- and rule-bound conditions of the European Parliament,
however, making this symbolic point only requires—and allows—
minor transgressions of norms. The EFF’s role as truth tellers is
more urgent and demands a 'radical and militant'35 approach to
break through the severe conditions of the elite’s authoritarian
practices of deception and repression. The EFF can then claim
that their act of disruption is a question of morality, of doing
'their constitutional duty… to defend and stand for what is
right.'36 (my emphasis). In both cases, the parties self-represent as
prophets of truth and democratic saviours. They are not one
amongst a choice of parties on an ideological spectrum but the
only voice of truth and the only possibility of saving the people
from suppression and deception. They obtain the legitimacy of
this role through the performance of authenticity where they
make use of complex and interrelated ﬂows of mediation in a
hybrid media environment.
Symbolic embodiment as efﬁcacious representation. UKIP’s
and the EFF’s portrayal of the elite rests on a notion of politics as
incestuous and self-interested, characterised by 'stitch-ups, slan-
derous accusations, voters’ wishes ignored'.37 Their own self-
representation as efﬁcacious representatives builds on their clo-
seness to the people. They make this claim both explicitly and
performatively with resort to the new media environment. In the
case of UKIP, the elite’s distance from the people is an institu-
tional problem; the EU is 'stuck in its own lavish bubble detached
from reality'.38 UKIP’s central claim is that the institution of the
EU takes precedence over the people in a manner entirely anti-
thetical to what democracy ought to be: 'The EU are putting the
interests of their failed project above that of their own citizens'.39
UKIP link this culture of self-obsessive, inefﬁcacious 'big
politics'40 to the institution of the EU itself. The elite render their
institution dysfunctional by an obsession with their own internal
squabbles while the people are forgotten, yet they are self-serving
in a collective sense, joining forces only to support the misguided
and nonsensical goal of the EU for the EU’s sake. Instead of
representing the people, the EU has become a bureaucratic and
self-sustaining eternity machine that traps and conﬁnes the
people, prompting UKIP to 'work for the freedom of people from
EU legislation and waste'.41Not only does UKIP equate the
European rule of law to waste; they also directly oppose it to a
vague notion of 'freedom', arguing that it removes representatives
from the people. In this sense the EU is an institution that
(unnecessarily) mediates the relationship between the people and
their national representatives and, in doing so, weakens efﬁcacy.
The EFF share UKIP’s view that the elite’s non-efﬁcacious
representation has lost sight of the purpose of democracy. But in
the EFF’s case, the new post-Apartheid black elite are portrayed
as traitors of their own people, enriching themselves through
positions of power: 'we know… that the ANC will never
nationalise Mines [as stated in the Freedom Charter] because
majority of its senior leaders are beneﬁtting from privately owned
Mines'.42 The corrupt behaviour of the elite subverts the
democratic culture of the institution of parliament, which the
EFF perceive as distinct from the elite who undermine it:
'Parliament…must be respected as sacrosanct'.43 In this view, the
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elite are authoritarians who by deﬁnition do not fulﬁl the people’s
wishes. To underline this argument, the EFF evoke South Africa’s
colonial past: 'Don’t be intimidating. We ﬁnished that',44 an EFF
MP protests as he likens the speaker’s attempt at quelling his
interruption to Apartheid-like oppression.
Both parties then view elite politics as immoral, undemocratic
and inefﬁcacious. But whereas UKIP point to the institutions of
the EU as problematic in and of themselves, the EFF champion
them as means of achieving efﬁcacy. In the EFF’s case, the elite’s
lack of efﬁcacy therefore resides in their self-interest, maintained
through authoritarian practices rather than through institutional
bureaucracy. UKIP can rely on institutional fatigue in a context of
established democracy. The EFF, in contrast, face conditions in
which the institutions of democracy are seen as sacrosanct,
expensively attained in living memory by the people themselves
through bottom-up protest. The EFF therefore signify the South
African elite’s distance from the people through their likeness to
the Apartheid regime. In both cases, however, the very act of
representing the elite as self-serving and unconcerned with the
interests of the people engenders inefﬁcacy: it makes people feel
their voices go unheard in the political process. In this sense, the
inefﬁcacy of the elite is to a large extent a populist construction,
even if it requires a ﬁrm foundation in recognisable reality.
In order to achieve the unproblematic mediation of this version
of reality, both parties engage in entrepreneurial communication
practices. First, they rely on modes of mediation that avoid
interfering media institutions and editorialising. Farage’s commu-
nications pivot on his own LBC radio talk show, regular
newspaper columns and tweets, while Malema and the EFF are
avid tweeters and hold regular live rallies. Such direct forms of
communication enable the untainted mediation of ‘ordinary’,
informal styles that signal a direct connection to the people, such
as Malema’s frequent use of slang—'Take a chill pill. Don’t be
tjatjarag45,46—which is so well suited to the norms of social media.
Second, both parties rely on simple visual imagery to be
conveyed through traditional mass media as clear symbolic acts.
Dressed uniformly as domestic workers in bright red overalls, EFF
MPs symbolically identify with ordinary South Africans through a
homogenous representation of the people and stand out from the
mass of grey suits of the mainstream elite in parliament as ﬁrst-
class camera fodder. Like UKIP, they claim to have resonance with
the people based on performative identiﬁcation. Farage achieves a
similar effect by frequently donning a pint of beer in photoshoots,
displaying a Union Jack on his desk in the EP, and spouting
provocations that at once create selling headlines and epitomise
the notion of political incorrectness as a sign of closeness to the
people and exposure of the populist’s private persona.
UKIP portray their wilful transgressions of the norms of
institutional behaviour and political speech as proof of their own
efﬁcacy: 'UKIP has not gone to Brussels and Strasbourg to be
placid and inert. We made a promise to you to ﬁght for what you
believe in. And that is what we are going to do'.47 While UKIP
promote disintermediation in the form of the eradication of the
EU as what they perceive as a mediating institution, they adopt
the same approach in relation to the media. Through frequent use
of the hashtag #PeoplesArmy on Twitter, for instance, they at
once engender efﬁcacy through the suggestion that they are a
force directed by the people, bypass the mediating institutions of
mainstream media, and signal a more direct relationship to the
people through Twitter’s ‘direct’ affordances with the use of a
hashtag.
Discussion
In the preceding pages I have outlined how UKIP and the EFF
respond to changes in a media environment characterised by
complex, multi-directional and often uncontrollable ﬂows of
production, circulation, interpretation and recirculation of poli-
tical meaning. The fragility of public representatives’ self-
representation in this new media environment becomes a
weapon in the hands of populists. They expose elites to new forms
of visibility in entrepreneurial ways, thereby undermining the
elite’s authenticity and engendering inefﬁcacy in their repre-
sentation. Emergent forms of visibility, authenticity and efﬁcacy
in populists’ own self-representation combine with populist
ideology, which pitches the elite against a homogenous people.
They manifest themselves in populists’ exposure of one particular
aspect of mainstream politicians’ behaviour that elites would wish
to keep invisible: the constructed nature of their visible
performance.
Despite denying that they adapt their practices to the media,
both UKIP and the EFF engage in disruption of political norms
that catches the media’s attention and lends them control of
both their own and the elite’s visibility. The two populist cases
thus address the challenges of the paradigm of visibility through
entrepreneurial forms of meta-performance, designing their
own performances to expose the crafted and crafty nature of
elite visibility management. To populists, visibility is not a
threat; it is a weapon. They turn the sharp side of Thompson’s
proverbial double-edged sword against the elite in a show that
captures both digital and traditional audiences. Their disruptive
performance pivots on their dismissal of any pandering to the
media as undemocratic whilst simultaneously showcasing their
imperfections through a mosaic of mediated forms. Indeed,
their ‘grit’, their norm breaking and their ordinariness become
emblems of their authenticity and badges of their merit as
representatives. The fragility bestowed upon representatives by
new forms of visibility becomes a celebrated occasion for
populists to wash their dirty linen in public—and that of the
elite. Populist disruption is then an act with two felicitous
outcomes: it forces increased visibility on and exposure of elite
falsehoods and practices of impression management; and it
manages populists’ own visibility in a volatile mediation
environment.
Populists’ public performances of supposedly backstage beha-
viour free them from the demands of consistent self-
representation that have become near-impossible to fulﬁl in the
new media environment. For a politician to be authentic, their
front- and backstage behaviour must be consistent. Both UKIP
and the EFF relish the exposure of such inconsistencies in the
elite, thereby providing the public with a 'sidestage' view (Meyr-
owitz, 1986, p 48) that lays bare the constructed nature of
mainstream politicians’ performances and renders them inau-
thentic. In doing so, they usurp the role of the media as the fourth
estate. The internal logic of the populist claim then builds on the
portrayal of populists’ authenticity as a matter of morality. In the
evocation of authenticity as a moral ideal, populists echo Taylor’s
(1992) account of authenticity. However, in the populist case,
their claim to morality manifests itself in the equation of per-
formed authenticity with truth. Such equivalence is founded on a
particular evaluation of elite performance, which gives rise to
populists’ own representation as truth tellers and to an essenti-
alism that amounts to illiberalism.
The reassurance of truth, coupled with embodied identiﬁ-
cation with the people, allow the two parties to engender
feelings of efﬁcacy in the public. These feelings are further
reinforced by the parties’ use of social media as a form of
symbolic action that signals that power runs directly from the
people to their populist representatives. While the two parties
share this behaviour, their different democratic contexts give
rise to different positions on the role of democratic institutions.
The EFF’s championing of the institution of parliament
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contradicts positions in the literature that hold that populists
always favour disintermediation (see, e.g., De la Torre, 2014;
Kriesi, 2014). Given the Manichaean element of populist
ideology, the illiberal and illegitimate practices and actions of
the South African elite invite the EFF to self-represent as
upholders of certain principles of liberal democracy. As a
consequence, they support democratic institutions, stand up
against corruption and demand increased responsiveness of
representatives to the people. Yet they ﬂaunt the norms of
liberal democracy and subscribe to a moral essentialism similar
to UKIP’s, which resides in the common self-representation as
‘unperforming’ and authentic truth tellers. Although the EFF’s
form of populist representation indeed seeks 'its unity in the
embodiment of the people' as De la Torre holds (2014, p 18),
the South African case suggests that democratic institutions
themselves can be imbued with a similar symbolic meaning to
complement such symbolic embodiment. The institutions
themselves then become emblems of victory for the silent
majority.
In the preceding pages, the concept of disruptive performance
has emerged as a signiﬁcant dimension of a populist commu-
nication style, and one with multiple facets. Disruption takes a
variety of forms: disruption of the norms of political speech, of
accepted political behaviour and of the performances of other
political actors. It further encompasses a range of signifying
practices as populist actors engage in symbolic action that stakes a
claim to: expose the falsity of conventional norms and procedures
of mediated representative politics, identify with a particular
notion of ‘the people’, and express populists’ ideology in pure,
unadulterated form. As such, disruption is a key means of
manifesting populist ideology in a way that simultaneously gar-
ners attention across the media ecology. In doing so, the concept
of disruption underlies the criteria of mediated representation: it
serves to control the visibility of the elite and of populists
themselves, it signals authenticity, and it provides proof of and
engenders efﬁcacy. It thereby proves itself a multi-faceted and
signiﬁcant concept that should be made more explicitly involved
in future research on populism.
Populists’ disruptive response to the new media environment
has several implications, and I will draw out two of the most
important ones in conclusion. First, UKIP and the EFF’s exposure
of the elite’s duplicitous and even undemocratic practices plays an
important democratic function, especially in the South African
context of a transitional democracy. Indeed, both parties found
their self-representations on a wish for a more substantive poli-
tics, a politics in which representatives have the people’s true
interests at heart rather than simply going through the motions of
the procedures of liberal democracy, like garnering votes and
winning elections. These procedures, they claim, are undertaken
by elites as means of duping the people into believing that their
rhetoric and masquerades are genuine expressions of democracy
when in fact they merely hide the elite’s self-serving ends. The
populist parties condemn both the media and the elite for losing
sight of the substance of representation: in their obsession over
image, they forget the people they both claim to serve. Populists
claim to, in contrast, have a moral quality that set them apart and
enable them to provide a more substantive mode of representa-
tion. They have an inherent understanding of the people—even
embody them—which they demonstrate through the perfor-
mance of authenticity.
Yet when performed authenticity becomes a moral necessity,
the populist parties allow it to trump social and political norms
and to legitimise the breaking of norms through disruptive
behaviour. A strong theoretical argument is emerging (Azari and
Smith, 2012), supported by empirical indications in the wake of
Trump’s presidency (Nyhan, 2017), that political norms are
essential for a more substantive form of democracy. More pro-
blematic aspects of norm breaking can legitimise the 'ugly
extremes of social exclusivism, such as nationalism, racism, and
sexism (Eriksen, 2002; Lieberman and Kirk, 2004)' (Enli, 2015, p
11). This is indeed often an effect of populism, as many empirical
studies corroborate. Thus, despite a populist call for increased
substantiveness in democracy, the deprioritisation of norms has a
potential to lead to reliance only on procedure and institutiona-
lised rules and legal frameworks in practice. This in turn ironi-
cally reduces substantiveness, especially with respect to
communication between citizens and representatives (Blumler
and Coleman, 2015), which in turn erodes the promise of
responsiveness.
A second implication follows from the populist claim to the
status of truth tellers: the assumed need of the people to be freed
from the elite’s veil of false consciousness. In the populist claim,
the act of disruption is undertaken in order to enable the mis-
guided people to see through the lies of the elite, to ﬁnally become
cognizant of the ‘reality’ that hides behind the masquerade of
‘politics’. This suggests that populists question Austin’s (1975)
adoption of felicity as a condition of evaluating performatives, as
opposed to truth. In the populist claim, felicity is normatively
problematic; it is an indication of the level of deception that
politicians have achieved over the people. The more felicitous the
performative, the more undemocratic the behaviour of the per-
forming elite.
Instead populists apply the criterion of truth to the perfor-
mance of ritual as a democratic practice, which in turn aids an
epistemological shift towards essentialism. The implication here
is that the essentialism inherent in the populist performance
allows no acknowledgement of politicians’ need to concern
themselves with image, style or differentiated audiences in the
modern political communication environment. To populist
eyes, all such inconsistencies are signs of what Meyrowitz
characterises as 'unscrupulous politicians who have no true
commitment to their own performances' (1986, p 279). As a
result, in the populist claim the only morally acceptable way for
public representatives to meet the challenges of the new media
environment is to perform a politics of morality. It is a circular
argument that replaces political value systems with morality
and truth as guiding lines in democratic practice. This in turn
creates an essentialist politics as a divide between us and them.
The implied lack of pluralism grows directly out of the heady
cocktail of populist ideology and new forms of visibility,
authenticity and efﬁcacy that are suited to the new media
environment.
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